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ABSTRACT 
 
We describe an access control model that has been 
implemented in the web content management 
framework “Deme” (which rhymes with “team”). 
Access control in Deme is an example of what we call 
“bivalent relation object access control” (BROAC). 
This model builds on recent work by Giunchiglia et al. 
on relation-based access control (RelBAC), as well as 
other work on relational, flexible, fine-grained, and 
XML access control models. We describe Deme's 
architecture and review access control models, 
motivating our approach. BROAC allows for both 
positive and negative permissions, which may conflict 
with each other. We argue for the usefulness of 
defining access control rules as objects in the target 
database, and for the necessity of resolving permission 
conflicts in a social Web/collaboration architecture. 
After describing how Deme access control works, 
including the precedence relations between different 
permission types in Deme, we provide several 
examples of realistic scenarios in which permission 
conflicts arise, and show how Deme resolves them. 
Initial performance tests indicate that permission 
checking scales linearly in time on a practical Deme 
website. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: access control, social factors, 
collaborative work, permissions, social web 
applications, content management 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Cloud computing and social web applications are 
increasingly being used by formal organizations (with 
paid staff and/or hierarchical reporting relationships) as 
well as informal social networks and virtual 
communities. In between are groups such as 
neighborhood associations, ad-hoc citizen groups that 
organize around particular causes, and committees of 
members in larger organizations such as schools, 
universities, and places of worship. In this paper, we 
argue that groups across this full spectrum, when they 
use shared computing environments, face issues related 
to what information each person should be permitted to 
access. In addition, we argue that previously developed 
models of access control are inadequate for addressing 
some of the issues that commonly arise in 
contemporary social web applications, in which many 
users have the ability to form overlapping groups and 
to publish and label data aimed at different groups of 
users.  
 
Our work on access control is instantiated in a content 
management framework for building social websites: 
Deme (which rhymes with “team”). Deme is free/open 
source software designed to facilitate collaborative 
production, document-centered discussion, and group 
decision making, flexibly across many different types 
of organizations of the types mentioned above. The 
access control scheme introduced in this paper, which 
we call bivariate relation object access control or 
BROAC, grew out of practical problems we faced in 
creating Deme as a framework that could support 
closed as well as open groups, with a high degree of 
user control over permissions to access and perform 
operations on data in a social web environment.  
 
2. THE DEME SCHEME 
 
In this section, we describe the architecture of Deme,1 
a web content management system and framework 
written in Django/Python, with a PostgreSQL database, 
licensed under the Affero GPLv3 license.2 Recently, 
the term content management framework has been 
used, somewhat controversially, to denote “an 
application programming interface for creating a 
                                                                  
1 See [6]. 
2 See [14]. 
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customized content management system”.3 We use the 
term framework to indicate that the system is designed 
to facilitate custom code development. Deme attempts 
to make available the concepts of object-oriented 
programming (OOP) to end users and nonprogrammer 
website administrators, using terminology that we 
believe will be more understandable to 
nonprogrammers. We define the basic vocabulary of 
Deme below with respect to concepts familiar to a 
technical audience.  
 
Items and item types. Units of content in Deme are 
stored in “items”. An Item is an instance of a particular 
“item type”. Deme item types are defined in an 
inheritance hierarchy. If the Person item type inherits 
from the Agent item type, then any Item that is a 
Person is also an Agent. Every item type ultimately 
inherits from the Item item type (which corresponds to 
the Object class in many programming languages). We 
allow multiple inheritance, and use it occasionally 
(e.g., TextComment inherits from both Comment 
and TextDocument). Deme items are stored in a 
database using object relational mapping (ORM)4 with 
multi-table inheritance. For example, if our item type 
hierarchy is Item -> Agent -> Person, and our items 
are Mike[Person] and Robot[Agent], then there will 
be one row in the Person table (for Mike), two rows in 
the Agent table (for Mike and the robot), and two rows 
in the Item table (for Mike and the robot). An abridged 
basic view of the Deme item type hierarchy is shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Pieces. Every item type defines the “pieces” (mapped 
to fields/columns in the database) relevant for that 
type’s Items, and item types inherit pieces from their 
supertypes. If Item defines the description piece, 
Agent defines no new pieces, and Person defines the 
first_name piece, then every person has a description 
and a first_name.  
 
Piece types. Every piece of an Item has a type (e.g. 
String, Integer, or Boolean). Pieces can point to other 
Items (foreign keys in the database). Pointing pieces 
are useful for defining relationships between items. For 
example, the Item item type has a creator piece 
pointing to the Agent that created it. Multiple Items 
can point to a common Item. Pieces cannot store data 
structures such as lists [8]. So rather than storing 
different contact methods as pieces of each Agent, we 
make ContactMethod an item type, and give it an 
agent_pointer piece. The contact methods for agent 
                                                                  
3 See for example [25].  
4 See Scott W. Ambler’s  explanation  of ORM [2]. 
123 are represented by all of the ContactMethods 
that have agent_pointer equal to 123. 
 
There are a few types of data object in Deme that are 
not full Items, but are rather what might be called 
quasi-items. These include Versions (one for each 
version of an item, archived similar to a wiki), 
ActionNotices (which record information about 
actions on an item resulting in a revision), and 
Permissions (see section 5). These Objects are not 
Items because to make them so would put us in an 
infinite regress (since all Items have associated 
Versions, ActionNotices, and Permissions. 
 
 
 
Figure. 1. The Deme Item Type Hierarchy  
 
Deme is an architecture for collaboration and the social 
Web. Every Item is commentable, and Comments can 
be transcluded, along with their resulting threads, at 
any location in a document, facilitating document-
centered discussion [5]. This is a generalization of the 
idea behind wikis, in that every Item can be set for 
open editing, but it is also possible to define elaborate 
(fluid, granular) access control for Items and their 
associated pieces/fields, in cases such as static websites 
and social communities where not everything is 
publicly editable. The framework is very extensible, so 
that a programmer can define new item types within 
the Deme hierarchy and take advantage of viewers that 
have been developed for a new type's supertype [4].  
 
3. ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
 
Access control in a software system is the process by 
which an authenticated user (the subject) gets 
authorized to perform actions on a data object. 
Subjects' abilities to perform actions on objects are 
represented in different ways in different models. The 
access control models summarized below represent 
different paradigms that can be instantiated with 
substantial variation in different systems. The models 
are not mutually exclusive: a given system may 
embody aspects of more than one model (e.g. the main 
system described in [18]). Nonetheless, they show how 
thinking about access control has progressed as 
software has evolved from traditional file systems to 
contemporary social platforms.5  
 
3.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
 
Traditional time-sharing systems, such as the early 
multiuser operating system Multics [30] and its 
successor Unix [29], store data in files, each of which 
has an owner. These systems give individual subjects 
the power to create data objects (files in this case) and 
to grant access to them by other subjects. This model is 
termed discretionary access control or DAC because it 
gives discretion to individual users over who else can 
access the data they create or “own”.6  
 
The permissions or rights that subjects have with 
respect to objects can be represented as an access 
control matrix (ACM). In an ACM, subjects s are the 
rows of the matrix, objects o are the columns, and each 
cell defines the protection state of access rights A[s,o] 
for a subject-object pair [20, 38]. An access control 
matrix is useful abstractly, but in practice access rights 
are defined too sparsely and the matrix is too large to 
be represented explicitly as a table [7]. DAC systems 
are therefore typically implemented in one of two 
ways: 
                                                                  
5 The access control models described in this section are not 
exhaustive. A few of the other models proposed include attribute-
based access control [40], context-based access control [3, 11], 
group-based access control [15, 34, 35], task-based access control [1, 
37], team-based access control [37], and user-centric access control 
[28]. In general, these are variants or extensions of the models 
presented here. See [18] and [38] for a discussion of models related 
to collaborative systems. For further discussion of the model 
proposed in [35], see section 4 of this paper. 
6 See [39] for a widely used definition. 
 
• Capability-based security, in which a subject 
obtains access to an object by being given a key or 
reference which gives that subject the capability to 
access the data object [23]. This is often 
represented as a capability list (C-list) of subjects 
who have an access right to for a given object [7, 
22]. 
 
• Access control lists (ACLs), which represent the 
set of users/subjects who can access a data object, 
e.g. those listed as Owner, Group, or Others for 
a file in the Unix system, together with what types 
of actions they can perform (e.g. (R)ead, (W)rite, 
or e(X)ecute) [7, 29]. 
 
3.2 Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
 
Mandatory access control [39] is a nondiscretionary 
model in which access cannot be passed from one user 
to another, but is instead defined by predetermined 
subject attributes (e.g. security clearances) and object 
security levels that are enforced by the system. MAC 
systems came about as a response to the security 
requirements of the military and other 
hierarchical/governmental organizations.  
 
3.3 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) 
 
In role-based security systems, subjects are given 
permission to perform actions based on their roles in an 
organization [9, 31]. RBAC is compatible with either 
discretionary or mandatory authorization, but in its 
pure form it represents permissions as features of a 
role, rather than of an object as an access control list 
does. A second innovation in RBAC is the ability to 
represent permissions in a more granular manner, so 
that a role can define what types of operations can be 
performed within an object, not just on the object as a 
whole (e.g. updating one field in a database record 
versus having write permission on a whole file). This 
supports a separation of duties in organizations [19, 
24]. The RBAC model has been standardized by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
[10, 32].  
 
The term role is often used interchangeably with 
group, as in a “group of users/subjects”. Roles or 
groups can be represented as subjects in an ACM-
based implementation. For example, in the Suite 
framework for collaboration [7, 34], permissions are 
represented in ACLs which can include groups/roles as 
subjects and groups of objects as objects. Suite was 
augmented with features for metalevel access control, 
yielding a powerful tool that can support multiple 
ownership of objects, rules governing transfer of 
access rights, negative permissions, and more [7]. 
 
3.4 Relational Access Control (RAC) 
 
Theoretical work on access control has led to several 
frameworks for representing access control policies in 
flexible, fine-grained ways, e.g. [12, 17, 27]. Rather 
than assuming a particular policy model, such as DAC, 
MAC, or RBAC, these frameworks typically provide a 
way to represent access control rules (ACRs) [22] that 
may apply to individual users, roles, and groups, as 
well as to objects, fields, and collections of objects.  
 
ACRs are relations, each between a subject (which 
may be a group of subjects), an object (which may be a 
collection of objects), an action, and sometimes a sign, 
where the sign (positive or negative) defines whether 
the subject(s) is (are) permitted or prohibited to 
perform the action on the object(s). This obviously has 
expressive efficiency advantages over having to define 
permissions over singletons, as in a traditional ACL. 
Granularity may be represented through multiple 
action types, granular objects, or both.  
 
Different frameworks allow different types of 
expressions, which may include the ability to infer 
permissions hierarchically and/or to define metalevel 
rules. Access control rules may be represented as a set 
of propositions in a framework or language for 
specifying ACRs outside of the target database [17, 
26]. Alternatively, they may be represented as relation 
objects in the database itself, wherein each row of the 
permissions table is a rule or relation, rather than a 
subject as it would be in an ACM-based approach. This 
overcomes the problem of representing many null 
values in the usually sparse ACM, and allows more 
than one ACR to be defined for a given subject-object 
pair. It also avoids having to store complex structures  
like lists or arrays within a table cell, in keeping with 
standard relational database practice [8]. We call this 
model relation object access control (ROAC).  
 
ROAC’s main advantage over outside-the-database 
methods of relational access control is that it integrates 
permissions within the database, so that code designed 
to interact with objects can access permissions/ACRs 
as well. In a social Web/collaboration context, this is 
useful because ACRs may need to be displayed in the 
context of the subjects and objects to which they refer, 
as well as searched and discussed. Using the database 
to represent permission relations can also be efficient, 
because pointers in the database can be used to refer to 
data objects in the ACR. And perhaps most 
importantly, it allows users themselves to modify 
permissions dynamically within the normal user 
interface. 
 
An example of ROAC was recently proposed by 
Giunchiglia et al., motivated specifically by new 
contexts such as grid computing, social web 
applications, and semantic desktops [12, 13]. In their 
system, permissions are represented separately from 
both the subject and the object, in a relation which 
points to both and which has the status of a first class 
object. Giunchiglia et al. call their model relation-
based access control or RelBAC.  
 
The core of the RelBAC approach is the representation 
of a permission as a relation object pointing to a 
subject and a data object. This is motivated by a need 
to manipulate and reason about permissions 
independently from users and the other stored data in a 
system, which in software with multiple instances will 
differ from one installation to another. But the RelBAC 
model itself is more specific than the ROAC model as 
we have described it. In addition to SUBJECT (or 
USER), OBJECT, and PERMISSION (an operation 
the user can perform on the OBJECT), the entity 
relationship model for RelBAC defines hierarchical 
sets of USERS (GROUPS) and of data OBJECTS 
(CLASSES) through an IS-A relation, as well as 
ACCESS CONTROL RULES and POLICIES, 
which instantiate permissions to specific groups and 
classes.  
 
The features of RelBAC are all theoretically useful, as 
they allow for inference of permissions from other 
permissions, and of subgroup permissions from 
supergroup permissions, among other capabilities. 
However, the more complex features of the model rely 
for their usefulness on assumptions that may not hold 
empirically in a given context, for example about the 
existence of hierarchical relationships among groups 
and among classes, which may in reality be 
overlapping rather than hierarchical. RelBAC also does 
not incorporate negative permissions/prohibitions (see 
section 4). The additional complexity of run-time 
reasoning required to make use of RelBAC's features is 
formidable and has so far apparently resisted a 
tractable solution [41]. Because Giunchiglia and 
colleagues have defined RelBAC in a rather specific 
way, we believe it is useful to classify it within this 
larger theoretical class of models we call ROAC.  
 
Relational access control (RAC) has been the subject 
of considerable study in contexts where fine-grained 
permissions must routinely be assigned, e.g. for XML 
documents [21, 22, 26, 27]. But to our knowledge the 
RAC paradigm has not yet been recognized as a 
significant alternative for collaboration systems.7 In 
what follows, we try to demonstrate how the ROAC 
variant of RAC can be implemented practically, as well 
as some of its advantages in a collaborative context. 
 
4. BIVALENT PERMISSIONS 
 
Traditional access control systems define access only 
in positive terms. If a subject is on an access control 
list or has a capability/key for an object, then the 
subject can access the object. Otherwise, and by 
default, the subject cannot access the object. But this 
does not allow for possible conflicts that can arise in 
social or collaborative contexts, in which an 
organization might want to explicitly prohibit some 
individuals from having access to a given data object 
when their membership in a group would otherwise 
give them access. An organization might want, for 
example, to exclude a member of its board of directors 
from accessing reference letters that were consulted by 
the board when it invited that member to join the 
board. Examples like this abound (see section 6).  
 
The need to define negative permissions  (prohibitions) 
in some form, either explicitly with the need to resolve 
conflicts (e.g. [34]) or via constraints in a role-based 
model (e.g. [16]) has been recognized by researchers 
studying collaborative systems going back at least to 
the 1970s [30]. As Sikkel [35] notes: “A 
straightforward model of negative rights is used in the 
Andrew system [33]. Rights exist both in positive and 
negative form. When both apply, the negative right 
overrides the positive right. In this way, negative rights 
can be used to immediately revoke a permission in a 
distributed system where propagation of changes may 
take a while.” Although some systems such as Suite [7, 
34] have utilized more complicated conflict resolution 
rules, negative permissions typically override positive 
ones [22].  
 
We call models that allow both permissions and 
prohibitions bivalent. In the access control system  
defined below, we too resolve conflicts between 
negative and positive permissions by giving 
precedence to the negative. Some motivating examples 
and how they are resolved in our system are given in 
section 6.  
 
                                                                  
7 See the 2005 overview of access control models for collaborative 
systems by Tolone et al. [38] and section 2 of the 2006 paper by Kim 
et al. [18], neither of which mentions relational approaches. 
5. THE DEME PERMISSIONS SYSTEM 
 
Deme implements an access control model in which 
permissions are defined as relation objects pointing to 
a subject and an object. It is therefore an instance of 
what we have called relation object access control 
(ROAC). Permissions can also be either positive or 
negative. To our knowledge, Deme is the first instance 
of such a bivalent ROAC (BROAC) model, and the first 
implementation of ROAC in a real-world context. 
 
In what follows, we describe the particular access 
control procedures in Deme. We intend BROAC to 
refer to a larger class – any model in which access 
control is both bivalent and represented as relation 
objects in the target database. 
 
Permissions in Deme define what actions Agents can 
and cannot do. Similar to ActionNotices, permissions 
are not Items themselves, but they are quasi-items that 
exist in the database and point to Items. 
 
There are 9 types of permissions in Deme, divided 
along 2 axes: the subject (data seeker) axis and the 
object (data sought) axis. Along the subject axis, 
permissions can be given at 3 levels: to a single Agent, 
to the members of a Collection of Agents, or to all 
Agents. Along the object axis, permissions can be 
applied to 3 levels: to a single Item, to the Items in a 
Collection, or to all Items. For both axes, we refer to 
these three levels as “one”, “some”, and “all”. The 9 
permission types are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The Deme Precedence System - Numbers 
in Parentheses Refer to Precedence Order 
 
   Object  
  Item Collection All Items 
 Agent One To 
One (1) 
One To 
Some (2) 
One To  
All (3) 
Subject Group Some To 
One (4) 
Some To 
Some (5) 
Some To  
All (6) 
 All 
Agents 
All To 
One (7) 
All To 
Some (8) 
All To  
All (9) 
 
Although we could accomplish anything using only 
OneToOnePermissions, the other permission types 
allow us to more concisely express permissions. For 
example, if our site was a wiki and we wanted any user 
to be able to edit any document, we would create a 
single AllToAllPermission, rather than a new 
OneToOnePermission for every Agent/Item pair. 
 
Each permission, in addition to specifying the subject 
and the object axes, specifies an ability string and an 
is_allowed boolean. When there are multiple 
permissions with the same ability, the permissions at a 
level with a lower number (shown in parentheses after 
each permission type in Table 1) take precedence. 
When there are multiple permissions at the same level, 
the negative (is_allowed=False) permissions take 
precedence over the positive permissions. Two 
permissions referencing the same subject, object, and 
ability cannot differ only in the value of is_allowed. 
Access control in Deme embodies a closed world 
assumption: Access is not allowed unless it is 
positively permitted by at least one permission object. 
 
The general principles that (a) prohibitions override 
(positive) permissions and that (b) more explicit access 
rules override less explicit ones are fairly standard 
[22], but the exact ordering of the precedence system 
might be controversial. For now, we regard the 
precedence system as plausible but in need of 
empirical validation by users.  
 
On both axes, when we refer to all Agents or Items in 
a collection (i.e., [X]ToSome or SomeTo[X]), we 
refer to both direct and indirect members. Thus, Deme 
checks the RecursiveMembership table to determine 
whether an Agent or an Item is affected by the 
permission. 
 
There are two types of abilities: item abilities and 
global abilities. Item abilities can apply to a particular 
Item (or Collection of Items), such as “can edit the 
name of the Item”; but global abilities apply to Items 
generally, e.g. “can create new Documents”. Each 
item type defines the item abilities that are relevant to 
it, and the global abilities it introduces. An Agent has 
an ability if (a) there exists a relevant permission with 
is_allowed=True at some level and (b) there are no 
relevant permissions with is_allowed=False at any 
levels with the same or lower precedence number.   
 
The global abilities defined in Deme are given in Table 
2.8 
 
 
                                                                  
8 Agents with the do_anything ability automatically have every 
single global ability and every item ability with respect to every 
Item. If an agent has this global ability in the final calculation, this 
overrides any item abilities at any level. As a specific unusual 
example, if an agent has the global do_anything ability from an 
EveryonePermission, then giving him/her any item ability with 
is_allowed=False will have no effect. 
Table 2. Current Global Abilities in Deme 
 
create AIMContactMethod  
create AddressContactMethod  
create Agent  
create Collection  
create CustomUrl  
create DemeAccount  
create DjangoTemplateDocument  
create EmailContactMethod  
create Event  
create FaxContactMethod  
create FileDocument  
create Group  
create HtmlAdvertisement  
create HtmlDocument  
create ImageDocument  
create Membership  
create Person  
create PhoneContactMethod  
create Subscription  
create TextAdvertisement  
create TextComment  
create TextDocument  
create TextDocumentExcerpt  
create Transclusion  
do_anything  
 
Some sample item types in Deme and the abilities they 
introduce are shown in Table 3. 
 
Deme implements discretionary access control: When 
an Item is created, by default no permissions are 
created except a OneToOne, do_anything permission 
between the creator and the Item. With this ability, the 
Item creator can create whatever other permissions 
s/he wants, either during the creation process, or later.  
 
When a database query is processed, Deme takes the 
currently authenticated Agent and decides whether the 
Agent has the required ability to complete the 
requested action (or to display some part of the view). 
Abilities are not just checked before doing actions, but 
they can also be used to filter out Items on database 
lookups. For example, if a viewer is supposed to 
display a list of Items the user is allowed to see 
(because they have the view Item.name ability), it 
will need to use permissions to filter out inappropriate 
results. 
 
To modify an [X]ToOne permission, one must have 
the do_anything ability with respect to the target 
Item. Similarly, to modify an [X]ToSome permission, 
one must have the do_anything ability with respect to 
the target Collection. Finally, to modify an [X]ToAll 
permission, one must have the global do_anything 
ability. 
 
Table 3. Some Item Abilities in Deme 
 
Item type Item abilities defined by the item type 
Item do_anything 
comment_on 
delete 
view Item.name  
view Item.description  
view Item.creator  
view Item.created_at  
edit Item.name  
edit Item.description 
Agent add_contact_method 
add_authentication_method 
login_as 
view Agent.last_online_at 
Person view Person.first_name  
view Person.middle_names  
view Person.last_name  
view Person.suffix  
edit Person.first_name  
edit Person.middle_names  
edit Person.last_name  
edit Person.suffix  
Collection modify_membership 
add_self 
remove_self 
Text 
Document 
view TextDocument.body  
edit TextDocument.body  
add_transclusion 
Site view Site.hostname  
edit Site.hostname  
view Site.default_layout  
edit Site.default_layout  
 
There is a potential loophole in the setup described 
above. A user could create a Collection, add a private 
Item to it (because they have do_anything with 
respect to the Collection), create an [X]ToSome 
permission for that Collection (because they have 
do_anything with respect to it), and thus gain full 
access to the private Item. In order to resolve this, we 
use the permission_enabled field in Membership. 
[X]ToSome permissions only propagate to members 
of the Collection through Memberships with 
permission_enabled=True, and Agents can only 
modify the permission_enabled field of a 
Membership if they can do_anything to the member 
Item.  
 
By enforcing this, we guarantee that when a user 
modifies an [X]ToSome permission, it only affects 
Items in the Collection that were added to it with 
permission_enabled=True, by a user with power 
over that Item. Since [X]ToSome permissions 
recursively traverse Memberships, we have a 
permission_enabled field in 
RecursiveMembership that is set to True if and only 
if there exists a path of Memberships from the parent 
Collection to the child Item, all with 
permission_enabled=True. 
 
Deme allows (optionally) for anyone to view content 
through the agent Anonymous. This creates another 
potential loophole for users who have negative 
permissions with respect to an Item, i.e. the user  
Anonymous may have a positive permission with 
respect to the Item, so that the user could simply log 
out and do what they are not supposed to be able to do. 
The interface must convey this to users who create 
negative permissions, so that anonymous access is 
disallowed in a similar fashion. 
 
6. EXAMPLES OF PERMISSION 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
To appreciate the variety of conflicts that can arise in a 
system like Deme, and the way in which the version of 
BROAC implemented in Deme resolves them, we offer 
the following example scenarios. 
 
Example 1. The executive director of a 
nongovernmental organization, who is hired and 
supervised by the NGO's board of directors, has access 
to most board documents as a member of the board's 
Group, but does not have access to those documents 
related to the board's deliberations over the executive 
director himself. The board's Group permission for 
reading its Folio is positive for the Collection of 
executive director hiring and review documents. The 
executive director's Agent permission for reading this 
Collection is negative. The latter (negative) permission 
has precedence. 2(-) defeats 5(+).  
 
Example 2. Each student has access to their own 
transcript, but not to those of other students. The 
Group of students has a negative permission for 
reading a student's transcript. But a student's Agent 
permission is positive for reading their own transcript. 
The latter (positive) permission has precedence. 1(+) 
defeats 4(-). 
 
Example 3. A student is a programmer for an 
academic program, and also a member of the staff 
Group as well as the Group of students. The staff 
Group has a positive permission for reading student 
intern applications. The students Group has a negative 
permission for reading intern applications. The latter 
(negative) permission has precedence, reflecting a 
policy that students cannot view transcripts of other 
students, regardless of their staff status. 5(-) defeats 
5(+). 
 
Example 4. The personnel manager at a firm is a 
member of the staff Group. The staff has a negative 
Group permission for accessing staff salary 
documents. But the personnel manager has a positive 
Agent permission for accessing salary documents. The 
latter (positive) permission has precedence. Note, 
however, that this example shows a limitation in 
Deme: that we cannot have group-based precedence 
relations. 2(+) defeats 5(-). 
 
Example 5. A member of a grassroots advocacy group 
edits the organization's homepage, publishing a 
statement not approved by the group. The member has 
been given permission to edit the homepage, but the 
group asks the webmaster to place a hold on the 
offending member's editing ability until the group can 
discuss the situation. The member has a prior positive 
Agent permission to edit the homepage. A new, 
negative Agent permission will replace, rather than 
coexist with, the old permission. No conflict is possible 
in this case. 
 
Example 6. The webmaster for an organization has the 
do_anything ability, and can therefore read any 
document, but is also a member of the staff. The 
Group for the staff has a negative permission on a 
security codes document. But the webmaster's Agent 
permission is positive for all Items, and therefore for 
this document. The latter (positive) permission has 
precedence. 3(+) defeats 4(-). 
 
Example 7. The user of a social networking site hosted 
on Deme makes a photograph prohibited to all users by 
default, but grants permission to see her photos to her 
Group of friends. All users have a negative permission 
on the forbidden photograph. But the Group of friends 
has a positive permission for the user's photographs, 
including the forbidden one. The latter (positive) 
permission has precedence. This illustrates how users 
both should be aware of and can take advantage of the 
precedence relations. 5(+) defeats 7(-). 
 
Example 8. A user of a Deme social networking site 
sees several photographs of herself in another user's 
Collection, the Items in which are visible to all users. 
She decides that she does not want those photos to be 
seen by anyone except herself. So she adds all the 
photos she does not want seen to her own Collection, 
labeled “private”, and sets a negative permission on the 
Collection for all users (except herself). The photos 
are permission_enabled. The latter (new, negative) 
permission has precedence. 8(-) defeats 8(+). 
 
7. PERFORMANCE 
 
The system described here (Deme) is still in pre-
release, but is already powering four websites, 
including the beta version of our academic program’s 
website [36].  
 
In order to empirically evaluate the performance of 
Deme's permissions system, we analyzed our 
program’s beta-version social content 
management/networking website [36], which contains 
approximately 1,000 users, 12,000 items, and 24,000 
permission objects. We made copies of the site with 
subsets of the content (one with 10 users and their 
items, one with 20 users, and so forth). For each copy 
of the site, we performed a query that retrieved all 
items whose name is visible to the anonymous user. 
We ran the query 10 times and calculated the average 
time for the query, and we also ran an alternative 
version of the query that just retrieved all items without 
any permission checking. The results of this analysis 
can be seen in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance of Deme Item Access 
 
Doing a linear regression, we see that in both queries 
the relationships between website size and query time 
are linear with R-squared greater than 99%. In the 
query without permission checking, there is a marginal 
time of 51 microseconds per item; while in the query 
with permission checking, the marginal time is 67 
microseconds. Of course, this does not necessarily 
apply in all cases. It depends on the structure of the 
particular website. In our particular examples, there 
were about 12 items and 24 permissions for every user.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
Deme and its associated permissions system provide a 
practical example for social/collaboration systems of 
the application of an emerging paradigm: relational 
access control. The need for flexible, fine-grained 
control that is visible to users as a seamless part of the 
system seems important for this type of platform, as it 
more easily allows users to interact with and modify 
permissions within the application itself. We have 
argued for and implemented a variant of this model – 
biavalent relation object access control (BROAC), 
describing how it functions, motivating it through 
examples, and reporting initial performance tests. 
 
The BROAC approach used in Deme represents a 
number of compromises. It does not allow specifying 
that one group or one collection has priority over 
another for resolving permission conflicts, and it does 
not allow for specifying hierarchical inference 
relationships between groups of users or collections of 
objects. But it does address the broad flexibility of 
ways that users can define groups and collections 
which overlap each other, and it accommodates 
negative permissions, in a relational access control 
model that we believe to be the first of its kind to be 
used in a practical system. 
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